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OF CUSTOM, TREATIES, SCHOLARS AND THE GAVEL: THE INFLUENCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS ON THE ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY 
 
 
Robert Cryer‡ 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The revival of humanitarian law as a subject of study has been at least in part an outcropping 
of the work of the international criminal tribunals created in the 1990s. Therefore it is no 
surprise that the influence of those tribunals on international law has been commented upon 
considerably.1 However, outside of scholarly speculations it has not been that easy to obtain 
clear evidence of how much influence those tribunals have had on customary law aside from 
their own decisions.2 There are two ways in which the tribunals may have affected views of 
customary law, through their constituent treaties and their jurisprudence. Neither is free 
from complexity or controversy. The difficulty involved in attempting to perceive the 
manner in which judicial decisions influence, or become considered reflective of, custom has 
been commented upon by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, who brought his usual sagacity to the 
subject, stating that ‘[t]he imperceptible process by which the judicial decision ceases to be 
an application of existing law and becomes a source of law for the future is almost a religious 
mystery into which it is unseemly to pry.’3 The relationship between treaties and custom has 
also been the subject of much discussion, upon which there is no shortage of dispute both at 
the general level and on particular rules. 
 
                                                     
‡ School of Law, University of Nottingham. I am very grateful to all the participants in the roundtable for their 
contributions to the roundtable and the considerable assistance I have drawn from the papers presented and 
the discussion they engendered, which has considerably improved my understanding of the study. I would like, 
in addition, to thank Dieter Fleck, Sangeeta Shah and Nigel White for their comments on an earlier draft. 
1 See, e.g. Theodor Meron, ‘War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law’ (1994) 88 
American Journal of International Law 78; Christopher Greenwood, ‘The Development of International 
Humanitarian Law by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (1998) 2 Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law 97; William Fenrick, ‘The Development of the Law of Armed Conflict Through 
the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (1998) 3 Journal of Armed 
Conflict Law 197. 
2 Which, of course, might be expected to take a sanguine view of their earlier pronouncements. On the other 
hand, certain influences, such as that of the Tadić interlocutory appeal (Prosecutor v Tadić Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995) on the ICC Statute can be seen, see, e.g. 
Lindsay Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge: CUP, 2002) p.160. 
3 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (London: Stevens, 1958) 
p.21. 
Against this background, the ICRC customary law study,4 which not only sets out the rules it 
thinks are customary, but seeks to show its ‘working out’ gives us an exceptional chance to 
evaluate how the international criminal tribunals and their practice have been seen by an 
independent international actor.5 Indeed, an actor which has been mandated by the Geneva 
Conventions to act as a guardian of humanitarian law.6 This opportunity is made even more 
enticing because the Study makes very heavy use of the work of the ICTY and the ICC 
Statute.  A quick count of the reliance of the Study on the ICTY and ICC reveals that their 
statutes or case-law are referred to over 170 times prior to the sections dealing with 
implementation and enforcement of humanitarian law. Unsurprisingly, in those sections 
reliance on those tribunals’ foundational documents and practice is even more pronounced.7 
It might be noted, however, that reliance on the ICTR Statute is less notable, and the Tokyo 
IMT almost non-existent.8 This replicates the secondary status to which those Tribunals 
have, unfortunately, been relegated. 
 
The Study had been described as a photograph,9 but it can be seen in a different manner, 
namely as a great impressionist painting. From a broad view, in its general conception and in 
many ways, it is a masterpiece, but the closer the look taken into the way it approaches 
custom is, the less beautiful it can seem. However, it has to be said that although by looking 
too closely at individual aspects of the Study, its overall quality can be missed. But the point 
is that a close analysis is important if the study is to be the beginning of discussions about 
IHL,10 which given its caliber, and thorough research base, it deserves to be.  
 
Given that the study has already had an impact on courts both international and national,11 
and been the subject of heavy, if not unpredictable, criticism from republicans in the US,12 it 
                                                     
4 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: CUP, 
2005), [hereinafter Study]. 
5 The precise status of the study as an ICRC document is a little more complex than might be thought. 
Although it was mandated by the 26th Conference of the Red Cross and Crescent, contains the ICRC logo on 
the cover and is said by the ICRC President to be believed by the ICRC to be an accurate statement of the law 
(Jakob Kellenberger, ‘Foreword’ in the Study  ix, p.xi) it is not a formal ICRC statement of views, and the ICRC 
states that it ‘respected the academic freedom both of the report’s authors and the experts consulted’ (ibid.). 
The Study (even if in preparation) is conspicuously absent from François Bugnion, ‘The International 
Committee of the Red Cross and the Development of International Humanitarian Law’ (2004-2005) 5 Chicago 
Journal of International Law 191. 
6 See, e.g. 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to Prisoners of War, 75 UNTS 135, Articles 3, 123, 125, 126. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 1125 UNTS 3, Article 5(3). 
7 On the ICTR and international law see Larissa J. van den Herik, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
and the Development of International Law (The Hague: Brill, 2005). 
8 The only notable use is in relation to command responsibility, see e.g. Study, Vol II, pp. 3768-3772  
9 Jakob Kellenberger, ‘Foreword’ in the Study  ix, p.xi,.Yves Sandoz, ‘Foreword’ in the Study, xiv, p.xvii. 
10 Sandoz, ‘Foreword’, in the Study, p.xvii. 
11 See Prosecutor v Hažihasanović and Kubura, Decision on Joint Defence Interlocutory Appeal of Trial Chamber 
Decision on Rule 98bis Motions for Acquittal, IT-01-47-AR73.3, 11 March 2005, paras 29-30,38,45-46 and 
domestically, Adalah and others v GOC Central Command, IDF and others, Israel Supreme Court, 23 June 2005, 
HCJ, 3799, 02, paras 20, 21, 24. Theodor Meron avers that the Study ‘will be a significant aid to international 
criminal tribunals’, Theodor Meron, ‘Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law’ (2005) 99 American Journal of 
International Law 817, p.833. 
is important, even for those sympathetic to the study,13 to appraise the study as objectively as 
possible, even though the aims of the study are unquestionably meritorious. In order to do 
this, it is necessary to begin by setting the international legal scene, of the general approach 
to treaties, judicial decisions and customary law in international law. Owing to some of the 
comments which will be offered later, it is also necessary to engage in a short excursus on 
the role of academics in international law. 
 
 
TREATIES AND CUSTOM 
 
 
With the possible exception of the Tokyo IMT, the statutes of international criminal 
tribunals all find their basis in treaty law.14 The London Charter of the Nuremberg IMT was 
a treaty.15 The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, although promulgated by the Security 
Council, find their legal basis in Chapter VII and Article 25 of the UN Charter.16Although 
the Statutes are not, in themselves, treaties, they are sufficiently analogous to them (and have 
been treated as such by the Tribunals)17 that for the purposes of this article they may be 
considered under that rubric. The Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty, and the legal basis of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone is a treaty between the UN and Sierra Leone.18 Therefore 
it is apposite to digress for a moment into the relationship between treaties and custom.19  
                                                                                                                                                              
12 On which see Iain Scobbie, ‘The Approach of the Study to Customary Law??’ (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law ??, pp.??; see also Malcolm Maclaren and Felix Schwendimann, ‘An Exercise in the Development 
of International Law: The New ICRC Study on Customary International Law’ (2005) 6 German Law Journal, 
1217, pp.1237-1238. There has also been criticism from members of the US forces, see, e.g. W. Hays Parks, 
‘The ICRC Customary Study: A Preliminary Assessment’ (2005) 999 Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law 208. 
13 Of which I consider myself to be one. Lest there be any misinterpretation of this piece, the compliments 
herein directed to the Study are not sops to professional courtesy, but a reflection of genuine admiration for the 
study, and the criticisms ought to be read against the background of my support for most of what the Study 
says, and its intentions in full.  
14 Even in the case of the Tokyo IMT, its basis is probably treaty law, i.e. the instrument of surrender between 
Japan and the Allies. 
15 1945 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis 
Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 UNTS 279. 
16 Prosecutor v Tadić, supra n.2, paras 28-40. 
17 See, e.g. William A. Schabas, ‘Interpreting the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals’ in Lal Chand Vohrah et al 
(eds.), Man’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (The Hague: Kluwer, 2003) 
847, pp.849-870. 
18 2001 Agreement Between the United Nations and Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court. 
This article treats the Special Court as an international tribunal solely on the basis that the Study does. In spite 
of its protestations to the contrary, (see, e.g. Prosecutor v Taylor, Decision on Immunity, SCSL-2003-01-I, 31 May 
2004, paras 37-42) the Special Court is a hybrid tribunal. For criticism of the Special Court’s views see 
Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmány, ‘Prosecutor v Taylor: The Status of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and Its 
Implications for Immunity’ (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 299.  
19 Probably the classic work in the area is Richard R. Baxter, ‘Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary 
International Law’ (1965-1966) 41 British Yearbook of International Law 275. A more modern, and very useful 
study is Mark Villiger, Treaties and Custom: A Manual on the Theory and Practice of the Interrelationship of Sources (The 
Hague: Kluwer, 2nd ed., 1997). See also Michael Byers, Custom: Power and the Power of Rules: International Relation 
and Customary International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 1999) pp.166-180; Jonathan I. Charney, ‘International 
Agreements and the Development of Customary International Law’ (1986) 61 Washington Law Review 971. For a 
critical view of scholarship on the relationship between treaties and custom see Arthur M. Weisburd, 
‘Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties’ (1988) 21 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1. 
 
Treaties and custom have what has accurately been described as an ‘entangled’ relationship.20  
The three ways in which treaties may interplay with customary law are, as is well known, 
summed up in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case.21 They are either that the treaty is drafted 
to reflect customary law at the time of its adoption, that the negotiating process crystallizes 
the customary rule, or that a treaty provision subsequently becomes accepted as reflecting 
custom.22 The difficulty, of course, is not stating the general propositions in this manner, but 
in determining in when each applies, or if any apply at all. 
 
Certain matters are tolerably clear however. One is that, as the ILA committee on the 
formation of customary law noted, there is no presumption that a treaty is reflective of 
customary international laws at the time of its conclusion.23 There has been some support 
for the proposition that humanitarian law treaties are an exception to this.24 When Richard 
Baxter, who is often cited as the fons et origio of this idea, canvassed the possibility it was only 
as a matter of lex ferenda.25 Nonetheless, there is some evidence that in relation to 
humanitarian law the standards of proof in relation to customary law have been relaxed 
when compared to other areas of law, particularly by tribunals dealing with the matter.26 
 
Even so, care must be taken with this argument, as a tendency to adopt the view that 
humanitarian law is customary without adequate proof is unlikely to convince skeptics of the 
accuracy of the result. There is no rule of international law that provides for a special status 
for humanitarian law in relation to the formation of customary law and it is a matter of 
evidence in any individual case whether or not a treaty rule represents the custom one.27 
 
In relation to this, there are a number of factors that have a bearing on proof of the 
customary status of a treaty rule. The first of these is the extent to which the treaty was 
considered codificatory at the time of its creation. One piece of evidence that this is the case 
is the treaty itself stating that it is intended to be codificatory of pre-existing custom.28 This 
is only evidence though; the statement itself may be incorrect (although the more States that 
ratify the treaty, the more States are estopped from denying the accuracy of the assertion).29  
 
                                                     
20 Oscar Schachter, ‘Entangled Treaty and Custom’ in Yoram Dinstein (ed.), International Law in a Time of 
Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989) 717. 
21 (1969) ICJ Reports 3. 
22 Ibid., paras 60-82. See also International Law Association, Report of the Committee on Formation of Customary 
(General) International Law 1, pp.42-54. 
23 Ibid., p.43. 
24 Baxter, supra n.19, pp.286, 299.  
25 Ibid., This is something misunderstood by Weisburd, supra n.19 , pp.39-41. 
26 See, e.g. Frederick Kirgis, ‘Custom on a Sliding Scale’ (1987) 81 American Journal of International Law 146, 
pp147-150; Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law as Customary Law (Oxford: OUP 1989). See 
also Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 757, pp.764-766, 772-774.  
27 See e.g. Michael Akehurst, ‘Custom as A Source of international Law’ (1976) 47 British Yearbook of International 
Law 1, pp.45-48. As the Study notes, p.xliii, see Maclaren and Schwendimann, ‘Exercise’, supra n.12, p.1123. 
28 See, e.g. ILA Report, supra n.22, p.44; Villiger, supra n.18, pp.232-236. 
29 Baxter, ‘Multilateral Treaties’ supra n.19, pp.277-278. Equally, the fact that preambles are not binding has a 
bearing on the question in situations where the statement of a treaty’s codificatory nature is made there, 
(Villiger, ibid., p.236). And that is where the majority of such statements are made. 
Care must be taken where the treaty ‘suggest[s] that some (unidentified) conventional rules 
may be codificatory. These formulations, while in fact providing little enlightenment, at least 
rule out a presumption that the instrument as a whole constitutes progressive 
development’.30 The next evidence relevant to determining customary status is the travaux 
préparatoires of the treaty. These may show that the intention of the parties was to codify 
customary international law in a particular provision, or perhaps even more generally.31 This 
includes ILC Reports where they are relevant. The travaux can also provide evidence that a 
rule crystallized as customary at a conference. 
 
In relation to a treaty rule which is progressive development of the law at the time of its 
promulgation, a later finding that it has become customary is perfectly possible.32 However, 
this is not something which is ‘lightly to have been regarded as having been attained’.33 
Nevertheless, this has certainly occurred, and some of the most notable examples have been 
in humanitarian law.34 As with questions of whether a treaty rule is codificatory or if custom 
crystallised at a drafting conference (or before), questions of evidence are important here.  
 
This should not be a surprise: The question whether a treaty rule has become reflective of 
customary law is a question of the presence or otherwise of State practice and opinio juris, in 
the same way as applies to the question of if any purported rule is one of customary law.35 In 
some ways, it can be more difficult to appraise practice in relation to a norm which has a 
pre-existing treaty basis, as the practice of parties to the treaties inter se can be attributed to 
the existence of the treaty.36 As a result, the practice of State parties to a treaty in relation to 
third-parties, and their response to that practice is very relevant in determining the 
customary status of a novel treaty rule. The statements of non-parties as to their views on 
the customary status of rules can also be very useful here. The existence of a treaty has, in 
the past, led States to set out their position as to whether or not the rules it contains are an 
accurate reflection of the custom. In humanitarian law, US views on Additional Protocol I 
are of particular note.37 
 
Turning back to later evidence, one frequently resorted to piece of evidence is the number of 
States that have ratified the relevant treaty. In some ways this is paradoxical, given that the 
greater the number of parties, the more practice can be referred to the treaty.38 Similarly, the 
greater the claim of a treaty to customary status at the time of its adoption, the lesser the 
impetus for States to bother to ratify the convention, as it will not alter their obligations.39 
Still, a very widely ratified treaty has a considerable ‘pull’ towards acceptance, as there is a 
                                                     
30 Villiger, Customary Law, ibid., p.232. 
31 See Villiger, Customary Law, ibid., pp.231-232. 
32 ILA Report, supra n.22, pp.50-54, Villiger, Customary Law, ibid., Chapter 6. 
33 North Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra n.21, para 71. 
34 ILA Report, supra n.22, p.46. The fact that the major rules of humanitarian law are of a fundamentally norm-
creating manner is not irrelevant here. 
35 Villiger, Customary Law, supra n.19, pp.182-183. 
36 ILA Report, supra n.22, pp.46-47. 
37 See, for example, Christopher Greenwood, ‘The Customary Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols’ in Astrid 
J.M. Delissen and Gerard J. Tanja, The Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1991) 93. 
38 See Baxter, ‘Multilateral Treaties’ supra n.19, pp.282-283. 
39 Ibid., pp.285-286. 
feeling that if a treaty is very broadly ratified, it represents the general expectations of those 
States.40 That certainly appears to be the approach taken by international tribunals. 
  
 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS A SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
As with the relationship between treaties and customary law, the status of judicial decisions 
as a source of law is a matter upon which the level of literature is particularly high.41 
Although judicial decisions are only mentioned as a subsidiary means for determining the law 
in Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute this understates the practical effect that judicial 
decisions have on the ascertainment, in particular, of customary international law. It is 
almost certainly trite now (although it may not have been in 1979) to note, as Igor 
Blishchenko did, that ‘international humanitarian law owes a great deal to decisions handed 
down by national and international courts.’42 The concrete form of a judgment, alongside the 
fact that it is (or at least should be) attended by a reasoned opinion gives a judicial decision 
considerable weight in international law.43 A quick perusal of the commentaries to the ILC 
Rules on State Responsibility shows that in practice this is the case.44 One of the most 
accurate statements of the status of judicial decisions in international law comes from 
Oppenheim: 
 
 
In the absence of anything approaching judicial precedent the common law doctrine 
of judicial precedent, decisions of international tribunals are not a direct source of 
law in international adjudications. In fact, however, they exercise considerable 
influence as an impartial and considered statement of the law by jurists of authority 
made in light of actual problems which arise before them…it is probable in view of 
the difficulties surrounding the codification of international law, international 
tribunals will in the future fulfill, inconspicuously but efficiently, a large part of the 
task of developing international law45 
 
                                                     
40 Such a process appears to have occurred with respect to at least most of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
41 The literature is so strong that it is to be hoped that readers will forgive the rather heavy use of quotation in 
this section. For some of the best examples amongst this literature see, in particular, Lauterpacht, Development, 
supra n.3; Mohammed Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (Cambridge: CUP, 1995); Robert Y. Jennings, 
‘The Judiciary, National and International, and the Development of International Law’ (1996) 45 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 1; Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied By International Courts and 
Tribunals: Vol 1 (London: Stevens, 3rd ed., 1957).  
42 Igor P. Blischenko, ‘Judicial Decisions as a Source of International Humanitarian Law’ in Antonio Cassese 
(ed.), The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 1979) 41, p.51. For a modern 
(and non-trite) appraisal see Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford: OUP, 2005) 
pp13-18. 
43 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law’ (1958) Symbolae 
Verzijl 153, p.172; Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at the 50th Anniversary of 
the United Nations (The Hague, Kluwer, 1998) p.28. See also infra ?? 
44 See James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Texts and Commentaries 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2002). 
45 Robert. Y. Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law: Volume I: Peace (London: 
Longman’s, 9th ed., 1992) p.41. The only caveat that may be entered is about the inconspicuous nature of some 
of some of the development of international law by some courts. 
As Mohammed Shahabuddeen has noted,46 despite the fact that a court decision cannot 
create law per se, by recognising the existence of a rule of customary international law a court 
decision may essentially act as the final stage of the crystallization of that customary rule.47 
As Sir Robert Jennings has explained though, there are limits to the role that international 
tribunals may take owing to their nature as law determining, rather than creating, agencies: 
 
[J]udges, whether national or international, are not empowered to make new laws. Of 
course we all know that interpretation does, and indeed should, have a creative 
element in adapting rules to new situations and needs, and therefore also in 
developing it even to an extent that might be regarded as changing it. Nevertheless, 
the principle that judges are not empowered to make new law is a basic principle of 
the process of adjudication. Any modification and development must be seen to be 
within the parameters of permissible interpretation. For otherwise judges lose their 
ultimate source of authority. Litigating parties do not resort to judges because the are 
wise or statesmenlike-very often they are manifestly neither-but because they know 
the law.48 
 
Similarly, the two bitter interlocutors of the first half of the twentieth century in British 
academic international law, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and Georg Schwarzenberger, despite 
their considerably differing methods, agreed on certain things. One of these was that the 
decisions of international tribunals were useful evidence of what customary law was, but, and 
this is a large caveat, this depended on the quality of the decision. Hence Lauterpacht, in The 
Development of International Law by the International Court said:  
 
the outcome of the general recognition of the persuasive force of judicial precedent 
has been the development of a comprehensive body of law which, in proportion to its 
intrinsic method, can be used not only as direct evidence of specific rules of law as 
understood by the court, but also as indicative of the method and the spirit in which 
the Court may be counted upon to approach similar cases [emphasis added].49 
 
Schwarzenberger, on the other hand graded court decisions as evidence of international law 
on the basis of the extent to which the court was impartial, free from personal interest of the 
judges, had an international outlook and had high technical standards. Even within those 
courts which, like the ICJ, fulfilled the general criteria, Schwarzenberger believed in looking 
carefully at the standard of reasoning in cases.50 As he said, ‘it is probably not accidental that 
the least convincing statements on international law made by the International Court of 
Justice excel by a remarkable economy of argument’.51  
                                                     
46 Shahabuddeen, Precedent, supra n.41, p.72. 
47 It might be noted parenthetically that, in the context of State Responsibility, States have expressly used this 
possibility to argue against any quick attempt to adopt the ILC rules into a treaty see James Crawford and 
Simon Olleson, ‘The Continuing Debate on a UN Convention on State Responsibility’ (2005) 54 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 959, pp.960, 966-968. 
48 Jennings, ‘Judiciary’, supra n.41, p.3. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘Judicial Innovation-Its Uses and Its Perils’ in 
R.Y. Jennings (ed.), Cambridge Essays in International Law in Honour of Lord McNair (London: Stevens, 1965) 24. 
49 Lauterpacht, Development, supra n.3, p.18. 
50 Schwarzenberger, International Law, supra n.41, p.30. 
51 Ibid., p.32. See also Mettraux, International Crimes, supra n.42, p.15. It might be noted that the ICTY has, on at 
least one occasion refused to follow an earlier decision of the ICTR it considered badly reasoned, see Prosecutor 
v Vasiljević, Judgment, .IT-98-32-T,  29 November 2002, footnote 586. 
 
Another word of caution also ought to be mentioned. Where a decision is quoted as 
evidence of customary law, care must be taken not to ‘double-count’ the practice in the 
decision and the decision itself. Cases are useful repositories of practice, and the views taken 
on them by international judges are entitled to respect. However, the two are, and ought to 
be separable. 
 
As an aside, it ought to be noted at this point that the proof of evidence of customary 
international law is not apolitical. A heavy reliance on the jurisprudence of international 
tribunals can be seen as a deliberate counter-hegemonic strategy.52 Ian Brownlie rightly made 
this clear in his 1995 Hague Academy Course on General International Law ‘[t]he 
hegemonial approach will necessarily favour the decisions of the Security Council, especially 
in the constellation of world politics. It will not tend to favour institutions like the 
International Court, which cannot be controlled by a small group of States’.53 The relevance 
here of Iain Scobbie’s comments hardly needs to be made express.54  
 
 
 
ACADEMICS AND THE DETERMINATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
Although the focus of this piece is not the influence of academics on international law per se, 
owing to their practical importance in determining the relevant impact of treaties and judicial 
decisions on customary law it is worth mentioning their role. Academics frequently write on 
the question of whether a treaty provision is customary or not55 and criticise the decisions of 
courts, particularly in relation to their assertions about customary law.56 It is to say the least, 
unduly self-denying to fail to take account of such work, in particular when engaging in a 
task such as the Study’s, which is to appraise the nature of customary law across such a broad 
spectrum of rules as humanitarian law encompasses. 
 
                                                     
52 On hegemony and international law generally see Detlev Vagts, ‘Hegemonic International Law’ (2001) 95 
American Journal of International Law 843 and José E. Alvarez, ‘Hegemonic International Law Revisited’ (2003) 97 
American Journal of International Law 873. 
53 Brownlie, Rule of Law, supra n.43, p.33. 
54 Scobbie, supra n.12, pp.?? Although José Alvarez has expressed doubt at the extent to which the ad hoc 
tribunals’ decisions can be independent of their creators. See José E. Alvarez, ‘Crimes of Hate/Crimes of State: 
Lessons From Rwanda’ (1999) 23 Yale Journal of International Law 365, p.398. Alvarez provides no empirical 
evidence of this at the judicial stage, however, and the extent to which China and Russia welcomed the 
decisions on the law applicable to non-international armed conflicts and crimes against humanity, inter alia, in 
Prosecutor v Tadić, supra n.2, paras 96-136 and Prosecutor v Tadić, Judgment, IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, para 627 
might be queried. Mark Osiel views the ICTY’s development of joint criminal enterprise liability as proof of 
their independence from the US, see, Mark J. Osiel, ‘Modes of Participation in Mass Atrocity’ (2005) 39 Cornell 
International Law Journal 793, pp.800-802. Martti Koskenniemi, in stating that the 1999 Tadić appeal (Prosecutor v 
Tadić, Judgment, IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999) demonstrated a ‘bias to guarantee as wide a scope for international 
prosecutions as possible’ at least implicitly takes the view that the judges of the ICTY have minds of their own, 
Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: CUP, 
reissue, 2006) pp.586. 
55 See, e.g. Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003) pp.91-94. 
56 See, e.g. the papers in the ‘Agora: The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory’ (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 1-141. 
Normally, the role of scholars in international law is at best a default one.57 Article 38(1)(d) 
of the ICJ Statute treats the outpourings of the most highly qualified publicists as being a 
subsidiary means of determining the law. There are those who further subordinate the views 
of scholars to the other subsidiary means of determining the law, judicial decisions.58 This is 
probably accurate, at least in relation to the extent to which a particular statement of law may 
be taken as authoritative. As Fitzmaurice made clear, the form of a decision and the attitude 
of parties to international litigation to decisions of tribunals make them of greater weight 
than the writings of jurists. Equally, judicial decisions often cite or rely on (sub silentio or 
otherwise) the views of academics. As it happens, this has particularly been the case in 
relation to humanitarian law through the international criminal tribunals.59  
 
Scholars have frequently engaged in detailed studies of customary law, and in doing so, 
provided evidence of how evidence of custom may be appraised, alongside critiquing claims 
of customary status by others.60 Like case-law, in proportion to their technical standards, 
such studies are of use in assisting in the determination of custom, and indeed the Study 
itself, and its judicial reception, is evidence of this utility.61   
 
The vast majority of the literature in relation to the impact of scholars on international law 
deals with the possibility that it has a constructive function, i.e. that scholars will attempt to 
push the law forward to a position which they consider appropriate.62 The constructive 
effect of scholarship can only be half of the story. As the extent to which a judicial decision’s 
view on what amounts to custom may be considered acceptable relies (inter alia) upon the 
quality of the reasoning of that decision, critiques of that reasoning are particularly 
important. Academic demolitions of the reasoning and results in cases can have a 
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International Law (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1968) pp.103-108.  
58 See, for example, Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Problems’ supra n.43, pp.174-175. 
59 See, e.g. Prosecutor v Krstić, Judgment, IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004, paras 10, 25; Prosecutor v Stakić, Judgment, 
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Critique of Contemporary Approaches (Delhi: Sage, 1993) pp.229-230; Jeremy Rabkin, Law Without Nations: Why 
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n.54, p.112. 
62 See e.g. Sir Robert Jennings, ‘International Lawyers and the Progressive Development of International Law’ 
in Jerzy Makarczyk, Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Essays In Honour of Krysztof 
Skubizewski (The Hague: Kluwer, 1996) 413. 
considerable effect on the reception of such decisions. The critical savaging that has 
attended some of the findings in the Yerodia case is a case in point.63  
 
 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STUDY TO THE TRIBUNALS 
 
 
Bearing in mind the above, it is time (finally) to move on to the approach the study 
proclaims itself to take to the international tribunals, through their treaties and jurisprudence. 
The first port of call on this is the introduction to the Study which, quite rightly, seeks to 
explain its methodology. In relation to the impact of treaties on custom, the study gives a 
fairly brief explanation of the interrelationship of treaties and custom, with a rather heavy 
emphasis on the number of parties to treaties64 (assumedly owing to the controversial nature 
of parts of Additional Protocol I).65 Even though, as we will see, the study relies quite 
heavily at times on the Statutes of the ICTY and ICC in particular, the only time the study 
expressly deals with the normative impact of the Statutes of international criminal tribunals 
is in relation to the Rome Statute. Thus we are not told of the relevant normative value of 
the other Tribunals’ Statutes at all. Given the extent to which they are relied upon, this is 
unfortunate, and indicative of one of the problems with the study- it is often silent on the 
weight given to particular evidences of custom, a point to which we will return. 
 
As it happens, the ICTY Statute, owing to the intention of its drafters, is very good evidence 
of customary law. This is because the Secretary-General’s Report on the ICTY, which is 
analogous to the travaux préparatiores of a treaty, makes clear that the intention in drafting the 
Statute was to stay within the bounds of customary law: ‘the application of the principle 
nullum crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of international 
humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the problem of 
adherence to some but not all States to specific conventions does not arise’.66 
 
The same is not necessarily the case in relation to the Rwanda Tribunal. The Secretary-
General was not involved in the drafting of the ICTR’s statute,67 and there are no analogues 
to travaux for it. The Secretary-General did report on the Statute, however, and gave some 
remarks which are relevant to the appraisal of its customary status. Commenting on the war 
                                                     
63 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) ICJ General 
List 121, 14 February 2002. For a selection of the critical literature see Antonio Cassese, ‘When May Senior 
State Officials Be Prosecuted for International Crimes: Some comments on the Congo v Belgium Case’ (2002) 
13 European Journal of International Law 853; Steffen Wirth, ‘Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ’s Judgment in 
the Congo v Belgium Case’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 877; Neil Boister, ‘The ICJ in the 
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64 Study, pp.xlii-xliv. 
65 The Study itself notes this. See the critical remarks of Daniel Bethlehem, The Law of Armed Conflict: Problems 
and Prospects: Chatham House, April 18-19 2005: Transcripts and Summaries, 9, p.12. 
66 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, UN Doc. 
S/25704, para 34.  
67 Daphna Shraga and Ralph Zacklin, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ (1996) 7 European 
Journal of International Law 501, p.504. 
crimes provisions in the Statute, the Secretary-General noted that by including Additional 
Protocol II in the jurisdiction of the ICTR, the drafters of the Statute (the US and New 
Zealand), had gone beyond customary law.68 The Study, despite relying on the ICTR 
Statute,69 at no point discusses this. This is not to say that its reliance on the Statute is 
necessarily wrong, but it is not sufficiently explained. 
 
Finally, in relation to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Secretary-General, who drafted 
the Statute of the Special Court (in negotiation with the Sierra Leonean government), clearly 
saw his mandate as limited to customary international law. As he said, again, 
 
In recognition of the principle of legality, in particular nullum crimen sine lege, and the 
prohibition on retroactive criminal legislation, the international crimes enumerated, 
are crimes considered to have had the character of customary international law at the 
time of the alleged commission of the crime.70 
 
 
This had specific effects. In his initial draft of the Statute, the Secretary-General included a 
very limited prohibition of the recruitment of child soldiers, on the basis that he was not 
convinced that the provision in the Rome Statute could have been considered customary in 
1996.71 Interestingly, the Security Council insisted that the Secretary-General replace his 
suggested provision with one which conformed to that in the Rome Statute,72 ‘to conform it 
to the statement of the law existing in 1996 and currently accepted by the international 
community’.73 It is very surprising that this is not mentioned by the study, particularly when 
it relies on the Statute of the Special Court as part of the evidence to establish that the 
conscription or enlistment of child soldiers has been prohibited by customary law.74 
 
To return to what the study actually says about the statutes of international criminal 
tribunals, the study limits itself to the statement that ‘it is important to stress, though it is not 
repeated in the commentaries, that with regard to the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, there was a ‘general agreement that the definitions of crimes in the ICC Statute were 
to reflect existing customary international law, and not create new law’’.75   
 
There are a number of points that need to be made in relation to this, which implies that the 
Study takes a rather broad-brush approach in its reliance on the Rome Statute. The statement 
is one about the intentions of the drafters at Rome, it does not say that the results of the 
conference lived up to this hope. It must be remembered that the Rome Statute was a 
product of compromise. The Rome Statute itself deals with the possibility that its definitions 
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70 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 4 October 2000, UN Doc 
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71 Ibid., paras 17-18. 
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73 Letter From the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General, 22 December 2000, UN Doc. 
S/2000/1234, p.2. 
74 Study, p.596. 
75Study, pp.xliv-xlv., quoting Philippe Kirsch, ‘Foreword’ in Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes Under the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary (Cambridge: CUP, 2003) p.xiii.  
are not necessarily as broad as custom allows in Article 10 of the Statute. Article 10 reads 
‘[n]othing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or 
developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute’. The precise nature 
of Article 10 is a matter of considerable debate,76 nonetheless it is, if nothing else a warning 
that the Rome Statute is not to be taken as anything more than a base-level of what 
customary law is.77 Yet the commentary makes no reference to Article 10 of the Rome 
Statute. 
 
Perhaps the best general comment about the normative value of the Rome Statute came 
from the Trial Chamber in the Furundžija case, which stated:  
 
In many areas the Statute may be regarded as indicative of the legal views, i.e. opinio 
juris of a great number of States. Notwithstanding article 10 of the Statute, the 
purpose of which is to ensure that existing or developing law is not ‘limited’ or 
‘prejudiced’ by the Statute’s provisions, resort may be had cum grano salis to these 
provisions to help elucidate customary international law. Depending on the matter at 
issue, the Rome Statute may be taken to restate, reflect or clarify customary rules or 
crystallise them, whereas in some areas it creates new law or modifies existing law. At 
any event, the Rome Statute by and large may be taken as constituting an 
authoritative expression of the legal views of a great number of States.78 
 
As we will see, however, some of the most controversial parts of the substantive law 
contained in the Rome Statute appear to be adopted by the Study, which thus contains some 
formulations which are more limited than custom. 
 
The final thing to note about the treatment of the Rome Statute is the Elements of Crimes 
adopted under Article 9 of the Rule Statute.79 Article 9 reads: ‘Elements of Crimes shall 
assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 8’. The intention of 
the drafters of the Statute was not that these elements were to bind the Court, but to act in a 
persuasive fashion to guide the court.80 The Study uses the Elements on a number of 
occasions, but at no time does the study explain the weight which is to be attached to the 
Elements. Again we see that the study is wanting when it comes to explaining the precise 
normative status of the documents it relies on.  
Moving on to judicial decisions, the Study is quite explicit that it has sympathy for the 
decisions of the international criminal tribunals, saying that: 
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Law Review 763. 
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Although decisions of international courts are subsidiary sources of international law, 
they do not constitute State practice. This is because, unlike national courts, 
international courts are not State organs. Their decisions have, nevertheless, been 
included because a finding by an international court that a rule of customary 
international law exists constitutes persuasive evidence to that effect. In addition, 
because of the precedential value of their decisions international courts can also 
contribute to the emergence of a rule of customary international law by influencing 
the subsequent practice of States and international organisations.81 
 
What is interesting, and perhaps concerning, about this is its omnibus nature, the 
jurisprudence of international tribunals is apparently considered, per se, ‘persuasive evidence’ 
of a customary rule without any reference to the quality of decisions by those Tribunals.82 It 
is no secret that the quality of decisions between certain international criminal tribunals 
varies,83 as indeed it does within those tribunals. The persuasive nature of an international 
decision does, and ought to, depend upon its quality. Given the controversy over customary 
law, the evidence used for it ought to be high quality, and care must be taken not to take 
court decisions simply as correct restatements of custom. The Study is correct to treat the 
Nuremberg IMT’s decision that the Hague Regulations attached to Hague Convention IV of 
190784 were customary as (now) uncontroversial.85 It does also note, on the other hand, 
citing Nuremberg as an example, that ‘[i]t appears that international courts and tribunals on 
occasion conclude that a rule of customary international law exists when that rule is a 
desirable one for international peace and security or for the protection of the human person 
provided there is no important contrary opinio juris.’86 This appears to accept that tribunal 
decisions are not always defensible on traditional grounds. This, however, might be referable 
to what is implied by the latter part of the quote above, that after a time, many controversial 
determinations of customary international law by tribunals become normalised. 
 
The influence of decisions on the study, however, is not entirely consistent. Responding to 
the criticism that the study does not deal with definitions of armed conflict and 
internationalisation of non-international conflicts,87  one of the report’s authors wrote to the 
critics explaining 
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87 Maclaren and Schwendimann, ‘Exercise’, supra n.12,  pp.1226-8. 
All that we could have done was to repeat the various provisions in treaty law…and 
possibly some dicta from case law of the ICTY. But we felt that this was not 
sufficiently exhaustive to make any statement.88 
 
This is a surprising statement, given that there is a rich jurisprudence from the ICTY on 
internationalisation of armed conflicts,89 including at appellate level.90 The matter cannot be 
considered to have only been tangentially raised in the ICTY. Even if it is the case that there 
is a strict ratio/obiter distinction in international law,91 the issue of the applicability of the 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, i.e. the nature of the armed conflict, was not an 
obiter issue. It was central to the conviction of, for example, Dusko Tadić on counts 
concerning Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions. It might also be noted that at least 
some of the ICTY’s jurisprudence on this matter has had a considerable impact on 
international law. The definition of non-international armed conflict given in the Tadić 
interlocutory appeal was taken up almost verbatim in the Rome Statute.92 
 
The disavowal of placing reliance on dicta from the Tribunals is also inconsistent with the 
treatment of such statements elsewhere in the Study. For example, the Study takes a very 
broad view of the customary law applicable to prohibited weapons in non-international 
armed conflicts.93 It is likely that their bold approach here was partially underpinned by the 
statement of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić interlocutory appeal that 
 
Elementary considerations of humanity and common sense make it preposterous 
that the use by States of weapons prohibited in armed conflicts between themselves 
be allowed when States try to put down rebellion by their own nationals on their 
own territory. What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars 
cannot but be inadmissible in civil strife.94 
 
The Study cites the paragraph (although not making clear how much weight it is expected to 
bear).95 Yet Tadić was not accused of any weapons offences, thus the statement was 
unquestionably obiter. Indeed, so were a considerable proportion of the decision’s 
determinations of what customary law applied in non-international armed conflict, which are 
also relied on in the Study.96 
 
These comments on the general approach complete, it is worthwhile investigating some 
specific areas where the Study uses the statutes and practice of the international criminal 
tribunals. It ought to be noted though that although elements of the Study are subject to 
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criticism, the majority of the considerable use made by the study of the tribunals is not 
problematic. Few, if any could criticise the reference to the Nuremberg IMT Charter, for 
example, for the proposition that murder is a war crime.97 The majority (but not all by any 
means) of the uses of the Rome Statute are similarly uncontroversial. The examples chosen, 
however, represent some more general difficulties with the approach in the Study.  
 
 
TAKING THE CASES TOO SERIOUSLY? THE LAW OF REPRISALS 
 
 
 
At times the study is perhaps a little over-sanguine in relation to case-law, taking some 
decisions as having a greater authority than their reasoning merits. Jurisprudence ought not 
to be adopted uncritically.98 As mentioned above, the persuasive value of case-law is directly 
related to its quality or reasoning. In the, admittedly controversial, case of reprisals, in 
particular, reprisals targeting the civilian population outside of occupied territory which are 
prohibited under Article 51(6) of Additional Protocol I, the study relies on a piece of obiter in 
one of the most controversial decisions of the ICTY, Prosecutor v Kupreškić.99 In relation to rule 
146, which entirely accurately states ‘Belligerent reprisals against persons protected by the 
Geneva Conventions are prohibited’100 the commentary concludes that  
 
Because of existing contrary practice, albeit very limited, it is difficult to conclude 
that there has yet crystallised a customary rule specifically prohibiting reprisals 
against civilians during the conduct of hostilities. Nevertheless, it is also difficult to 
assert that a right to resort to such reprisals continues to exist on the strength of the 
practice of only a limited number of States, some of which is ambiguous. Hence, 
there appears, at a minimum, to exist a trend in favour of prohibiting such reprisals. 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in its review of the 
Martić case in 1996 and in its judgement in the Kupreškić case in 2000, found that 
there was such a prohibition already in existence, based largely in the imperatives of 
humanity or public conscience. These are important indications, consistent with a 
substantial body of practice now condemning or outlawing such reprisals.101 
 
It is not the purpose of this section to deny the moral and practical problems, which are 
fairly well described by the Study,102 which accompany reprisals. However, the reliance on the 
Martić and Kupreškić cases, although careful (the study does not assert the cases settled the 
issue), fails to note that the reasoning in the cases has been subjected, on a legal level, to 
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quite devastating critique.103 As Christopher Greenwood put it ‘[t]he Trial Chamber in 
Kupreškić…cited virtually no State practice at all and what it did cite does not support the 
conclusions it drew’.104 Frits Kalshoven goes further, and states that the attempt to read 
practice the way the Trial Chamber did in Kupreškić, and use the Martens Clause to paper 
over the cracks in practice is ‘founded on quicksand’.105 On that basis, he concluded that ‘the 
Kupreškić judgment fall[s] in the category of judicial decisions that not merely have no 
binding force of precedent, but lack persuasive authority’.106 
 
Against this background, it is difficult to see those cases as contributing a ‘trend’. The 
response of academics to the decision at least partially undermines the case’s contribution to 
it. It might be noted, although owing to the timing of its publication meant that the Study 
could not take it into account, the UK Manual of Military Law is clear that the UK has taken 
the view that the decision in Kupreškić is, insofar as it relates to a customary prohibition on 
reprisals, simply wrong.107 Failing to refer to the commentaries on the decisions, which 
directly impugned the reasoning and presaged, if not influenced, State responses, is 
unfortunate. It is quite possible that the Study did in fact take into account these critiques. 
After all, it is careful not to follow the Kupreškić decision slavishly (and that point should be 
reiterated, as it implies that the Study has not, in practice, always taken the general view the 
introduction suggests). If it did take those academic views into account, however, the Study 
ought to have made this clear. The second volume of Study contains a plethora of practice 
relied upon (and excerpts from cases), to show how the rules were justified. If other 
considerations, such as academic commentaries, were taken into account, then it is 
important to state this alongside the practice.108  
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TAKING ROME TOO SERIOUSLY-SUPERIOR ORDERS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND 
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY  
 
 
The Study appears to take the sometimes controversial parts of the Rome Statute at face 
value, ignoring the drafting history of those provisions, and ignoring academic commentary 
on those provisions and their customary or otherwise status. Three particular areas spring to 
mind on this: superior orders, the formulation of the offence of launching an attack with 
excessive collateral damage and (civilian) superior responsibility. 
 
Superior Orders 
 
To begin with superior orders, the Study, in rule 155, provides that ‘Obeying a superior order 
does not relieve a subordinate of criminal responsibility if they subordinate knew or should 
have known that the act ordered was unlawful or should have known because the manifestly 
unlawful nature of the act.’ It might be surprising, therefore that the explanation of the rule 
in the commentary begins by noting that the rule that superior orders are not a defence ‘was 
set forth’ in the Charter of the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs, and that the principle was not 
rejected in the drafting of the additional protocols.109 This is entirely true, however, the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs Statutes did not contain any requirement that the order be 
manifestly unlawful. They excluded the defence completely. The statement in the Study is 
followed by the assertion that  
 
the rule that superior orders are not a defence is restated in the Statutes of the 
International Criminal Court, of the International Criminal tribunals of the Former 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and in 
UNTAET regulation No 2000/15 for East Timor. Conditions are spelled out in 
some detail in the Statute of the International Criminal Court: obedience to an order 
is not a defence when the person knew the order was unlawful of when the order 
was manifestly unlawful.110 
 
This mixes two very different sets of provisions. All the documents mentioned, other than 
the Rome Statute, provide that superior orders are not a defence per se, but the commentary 
gives the impression that they are ad idem on superior orders. They almost are. The only 
treaty mentioned which supports the rule they assert, rather than the rule that superior 
orders are not a defence at all, is the Rome Statute.  
 
The finding would have been more nuanced had it referred to the considerable academic 
commentary that supports or casts doubt on the customary nature of Article 33 of the ICC 
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109 Study, p.565 
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Statute.111 Some of that academic commentary also deals with the case law (much of which is 
cited by the study), and explains it on the basis that it relates to generally applicable domestic 
laws rather than those specifically applicable to international crimes.112 This is not to say that 
the rule as formulated in the study is necessarily wrong, the Study does cite practice in 
support of the rule, however, it is fair to say that much of this practice (from both before 
and after Rome) seems to have been filtered through the lens of Article 33 of the Rome 
Statute, whilst other practice relating to the tribunals (including the ICTY and SCSL, which 
were meant to state the customary rules) has been seemingly downgraded to a secondary 
status. As the Study has done this, it needs to explain why the unequivocal rejection of a 
superior orders defence was acceptable when the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL Statutes were being 
drafted, but customary law now provides for a wider defence. 
 
 
Collateral Damage 
 
 
To move ion from defences, it is worth looking at an offence which the Study seems to take 
its formulation, rather uncritically, from the Rome Statute. This is the war crime of excessive 
collateral damage. The customary rule, at least according to the ICTY (whose decisions on 
this subject are fairly well reasoned) is that the provisions in Additional Protocol I are 
customary which, as serious violations of humanitarian law, are criminal.113 However, the 
Study’s commentary to rule 156, expands upon the statement that ‘serious violations of 
international humanitarian law constitute war crimes’114 by averring that there is a war crime 
related to launching an attack that causes disproportionate damage, which is framed as 
follows:115  
 
 
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects which would be clearly 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected.’ 
 
 
The Study quite rightly notes that this wording is drawn from Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the 
Rome Statute. It also candidly points out that the framing of the Rome Statute on this matter 
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is different to that of Additional Protocol I.116 Article 85(3)(c) of Additional Protocol I 
prohibits 
[launching] an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated 
The study does note that the word ‘overall’ as an adjective for concrete and ‘direct 
military advantage’ is missing from the rule, although it is present in the Rome Statute, but 
avers that the meaning is the same. This is possibly the case although the position is not 
absolutely clear,117 and the interpretation of ‘concrete and direct’ is a matter of considerable 
controversy.118  
However, by pointing to one alteration, the Study passes over a far more controversial 
one. This is an addition to the rule over the formulation in AP I. The word ‘clearly’ is added 
as a qualifier to ‘excessive’. The commentary to the rule does not explain the addition of this 
term, which only appears in the Rome Statute. The addition of the word was controversial in 
Rome. It was unprecedented and opposed by a number of States.119 The addition of the 
term, which has had no effect on ICTY jurisprudence on the definition of the offence in 
customary international law, also has a negative impact on the rule.  The term does not fulfill 
its ostensible purpose, which was to clarify the crime, but simply raises the threshold and 
introduces greater uncertainty into the law in this area.120  
This is interesting, given that here we have a treaty (API), which has been declared by the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY to reflect custom on this point, being passed over in favour 
of the Rome Statute. Given that jurisprudence is considered persuasive by the Study, and the 
Rome Statute is thought a good reflection of custom, the Study needs to explain why one was 
chosen over another. Again, there is literature in the area that clarifies the customary statute 
of the Rome Statute accurately.121 Engagement, or perhaps explicit engagement, with the 
travaux (such that there are), case-law and academic commentary on this provision is 
important and would perhaps have led to a different rule being formulated. It would at least 
have blunted Daniel Bethlehem’s critiques that the Study deviates from treaty texts without 
explaining why, and fails to explain the ‘weight’ it puts on practice, which are applicable 
here.122 
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Superior Responsibility 
 
Having appraised one rule about a defence and one rule about an offence, let us turn to a 
principle of liability, namely command responsibility. Within the rule postulated by the Study, 
which is for the most part uncontroversial, one issue stands out. The traditional view, as 
(apparently) accepted in the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL statutes,123 is that the mental element for 
command responsibility is the same, whether the person is a civilian or a military superior.124 
Rule 153 of the Study, on its face, appears to accept the point: 
Commanders and other superiors are criminally responsible for war crimes 
committed by their subordinates if they knew, or had reason to know, that the 
subordinates were about to commit or were committing such crimes…. 
However in the commentary to rule 153 the Study, notes, that  
for superiors other than military commanders, the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court uses the language: “consciously disregarded information which 
clearly indicated….This standard was used by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwand in the Kayishema and Ruzindana case in 1999 to delineate the meaning of “had 
reason to know” for non-military commanders.125 
The first problem with the Study on this point is that it does not explain the relationship 
between this statement and Rule 153. By stating the fact, but not further commenting on it, 
the implication is that the Study is supportive of the Rome Statute/Kayishema and Ruzindana 
approach, or at least happy to allow the statements to go uncontroverted. This is 
problematic. The Study ought to have made clear that it was only late in the Rome 
negotiations that the proposal to separate off civilian superiors from military superiors was 
made, and the chair of the negotiations was clearly uncomfortable about the customary 
status of the distinction.126  
The Study’s reference to the use of the Rome standard in 1999 for civilian command 
responsibility to interpret ‘had reason to know’ by the ICTR in Kayishema and Ruzindana127 
also needs both contextualization and further comment. The first tribunal to deal with 
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civilian command responsibility, the Tokyo IMT, made no distinction between the standards 
applied to military and civilian leaders in its judgment.128  
In the Čelebići Trial Chamber decision it was decided that that once the qualifications to 
become subject to the standard (i.e. effective control) are complete, then the mens rea 
standard is the same whether a person is a civilian or a servicemember.129  Later cases, such 
as the Čelebići Appeal Judgment, have sometimes been bashful about the relationship 
between customary law and the formulation of command responsibility in the Rome 
Statute.130 But the simple fact that these decisions post-date the Rome Statute, and the fact 
that the extent to which the Rome Statute was reflective of custom in this area was 
controversial in relation to an issue which was far less debated at Rome,131 at least ought to 
have merited some reference in the commentary. As should the academic writings that show 
that the standard in Rome was retrogressive with respect to customary law.132 Whether the 
Study’s authors agree with these commentaries or not, the commentary as it stands may be 
faulted is both ambiguous in its relationship with the Rule and either selective or incomplete 
in relation to its appraisal of practice, case-law and doctrine. 
 
 
READING THE SMALL PRINT: THE RULES AND THE COMMENTARIES 
 
 
This leads to a final, more general critique that may be made of the Study. The rules 
themselves cannot be seen as self-contained. Like ILC rules such as those on State 
Responsibility; the rules in the Study have to be read with their commentary. And this is not 
in itself a problem, but as was noted above in relation to command responsibility what the 
rule gives, the commentary sometimes takes away.133 This is compounded by the fact that 
the Study does not always makes clear in the commentary where it is simply reporting 
practice for comprehensiveness rather than for its authority, and where it is intended to 
interpret, or qualify the language in the rule. To take, as another example, Rule 156 on war 
crimes. The rule itself reads ‘Serious violations of international humanitarian law constitute 
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war crimes’, which seems both clear and simple, and to take the correct position on the 
question of whether or not a separate rule criminalising the violation (serious or not) is 
required.134 However, in the commentary to the rule, the Study refers to consistent ICTY and 
ICTR jurisprudence, traceable basically to the Tadić appeal decision, to the effect that there 
must be a separate rule criminalising the violation for such a violation to amount to a war 
crime.135 Leaving aside the fact, as the Study quite rightly notes, that earlier practice was not 
to this effect,136 the study seems to have sympathy for the Tadić approach, by stating that 
Tadić et al do ‘not exclude the possibility that a State may define under its national law other 
violations of international humanitarian law as war crimes. The consequences of so doing, 
however, remain internal and there is no internationalisation of the obligation to repress 
those crimes and no universal jurisdiction’.137 However, if this is the case, the commentary 
has undermined the rule. Here we can see an over-reliance on ICTY jurisprudence without 
sufficient evaluation of the quality of the decisions being relied upon,138 but this time with 
the superaddition of greater uncertainty as even to what the rule asserted to be customary is. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
The foregoing is critical of the Study. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the critique is 
of aspects of how the Study, in limited cases, has relied (or not relied) on documents and 
cases without always taking into account their background or quality. A majority of its 
conclusions can be supported wholeheartedly. The critiques above are emphatically not that 
the Study consistently overstates custom, or even that it has a tendency to. Indeed, the 
majority of the above is implicitly based on the feeling that in relation to at least a small 
number of issues, it could have gone a little further without going beyond existing law. 
  
The work of a critic is an easy one, especially when compared to that of an author. As a 
work of scholarship, the Study is a stunning piece of work. Against the background of the 
difficulty of establishing custom at all, the Study has gone a huge way towards setting out the 
position under custom, and by even setting down the rules, has provided both impetus for 
further study in the area and a basis for debate.139 The simple fact that within the confines of 
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one piece, or even a symposium, it is impossible to do more than begin to discuss the issues 
raised by the Study, its approach and conclusions is testament to its extraordinary breadth, 
depth and vision.  
